Sysmon Event IDs: Cheat Sheet for Threat Hunting

Every Sysmon event ID in one table, what each one records, and the handful you will use in almost every hunt: process creation, network connections, registry changes and DNS queries.

Detection8 min readPublished 16 November 2026
FR

Francisco RamosGREM

Founder · Malware Analyst · Lead Instructor

What is Sysmon and why do hunters rely on it?

The native Windows logs answer "who logged on" well, but say little about what ran afterwards. Sysmon fills that gap. What it records depends entirely on its XML configuration: a default install with no configuration logs very little, which is why most teams start from a community configuration such as SwiftOnSecurity's or Olaf Hartong's sysmon-modular and tune it.

Every Sysmon event ID in one table

IDEventWhat it tells you
1Process creationImage, full command line, parent process, user, hashes. The most useful event of all.
2File creation time changedA process altered a file's timestamp: classic timestomping.
3Network connectionProcess, source and destination IP and port. Disabled in many configs because of volume.
4Sysmon service state changedSysmon started or stopped. A stop you did not plan is suspicious.
5Process terminatedWhen a process ended. Useful to bound short-lived tools.
6Driver loadedA kernel driver was loaded, with its signature status.
7Image loadedA DLL loaded into a process. Very noisy; enable selectively.
8CreateRemoteThreadA process started a thread in another one: a common injection technique.
9RawAccessReadRaw disk reads that bypass the file system, used to copy locked files.
10Process accessA process opened another one. The key event for spotting LSASS credential dumping.
11File createA file was created or overwritten. Watch startup folders and temp paths.
12Registry object created or deletedRegistry keys and values created or deleted.
13Registry value setA registry value was written, such as a Run key for persistence.
14Registry key or value renamedA key or value was renamed.
15File stream createdAn alternate data stream was created, for example Zone.Identifier on downloads.
16Sysmon configuration changedThe configuration was changed. Expect it only during your own deployments.
17Pipe createdA named pipe was created. Some C2 frameworks use recognisable pipe names.
18Pipe connectedA process connected to a named pipe.
19, 20, 21WMI event filter, consumer, bindingWMI event subscriptions: a stealthy persistence mechanism.
22DNS queryThe domain a process asked for, and which process asked.
23File delete (archived)A file was deleted and a copy kept, if the configuration says so.
24Clipboard changeClipboard contents captured. Off unless you have a specific reason.
25Process tamperingProcess image changed in memory, as in process hollowing or herpaderping.
26File delete detectedA file was deleted (logged without archiving it).
27, 28File block executable / shreddingSysmon blocked the creation of an executable or a file shredding operation.
29File executable detectedA new executable file was written to disk.
255ErrorSysmon itself hit an error.
IDs 27 and later only exist in recent Sysmon versions.

Which Sysmon events matter most when you hunt?

Most hunts start from four events, because together they reconstruct what happened on a machine:

  • Event 1 (process creation) gives you the story: which program ran, with which arguments and who launched it. Odd parent-child pairs, such as Word starting PowerShell, show up here.
  • Event 3 (network connection) links that process to an external IP address, which is how you find the beacon behind a suspicious binary.
  • Event 13 (registry value set) reveals persistence: Run and RunOnce keys, services, and other autostart locations.
  • Event 22 (DNS query) tells you which domain was resolved before a connection, and by which process, which the firewall log cannot.

Event 10 deserves its own mention: an unusual process opening lsass.exe with read access is one of the most reliable signs of credential theft.

How do you search Sysmon logs?

On a single machine you can use Event Viewer (Applications and Services Logs › Microsoft › Windows › Sysmon › Operational) or PowerShell. At scale, the events are shipped to a SIEM and searched with its query language.

Get-WinEvent -LogName 'Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' -FilterXPath '*[System[EventID=1]]' -MaxEvents 20 |
  Select-Object TimeCreated, Message
The last 20 process creations on this machine.

To sweep exported .evtx files for known patterns, tools such as Chainsaw or Hayabusa apply SIGMA rules to Sysmon and Windows logs in seconds. Both appear in the threat hunting courses.

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