What is Sysmon and why do hunters rely on it?
The native Windows logs answer "who logged on" well, but say little about what ran afterwards. Sysmon fills that gap. What it records depends entirely on its XML configuration: a default install with no configuration logs very little, which is why most teams start from a community configuration such as SwiftOnSecurity's or Olaf Hartong's sysmon-modular and tune it.
Every Sysmon event ID in one table
| ID | Event | What it tells you |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Process creation | Image, full command line, parent process, user, hashes. The most useful event of all. |
| 2 | File creation time changed | A process altered a file's timestamp: classic timestomping. |
| 3 | Network connection | Process, source and destination IP and port. Disabled in many configs because of volume. |
| 4 | Sysmon service state changed | Sysmon started or stopped. A stop you did not plan is suspicious. |
| 5 | Process terminated | When a process ended. Useful to bound short-lived tools. |
| 6 | Driver loaded | A kernel driver was loaded, with its signature status. |
| 7 | Image loaded | A DLL loaded into a process. Very noisy; enable selectively. |
| 8 | CreateRemoteThread | A process started a thread in another one: a common injection technique. |
| 9 | RawAccessRead | Raw disk reads that bypass the file system, used to copy locked files. |
| 10 | Process access | A process opened another one. The key event for spotting LSASS credential dumping. |
| 11 | File create | A file was created or overwritten. Watch startup folders and temp paths. |
| 12 | Registry object created or deleted | Registry keys and values created or deleted. |
| 13 | Registry value set | A registry value was written, such as a Run key for persistence. |
| 14 | Registry key or value renamed | A key or value was renamed. |
| 15 | File stream created | An alternate data stream was created, for example Zone.Identifier on downloads. |
| 16 | Sysmon configuration changed | The configuration was changed. Expect it only during your own deployments. |
| 17 | Pipe created | A named pipe was created. Some C2 frameworks use recognisable pipe names. |
| 18 | Pipe connected | A process connected to a named pipe. |
| 19, 20, 21 | WMI event filter, consumer, binding | WMI event subscriptions: a stealthy persistence mechanism. |
| 22 | DNS query | The domain a process asked for, and which process asked. |
| 23 | File delete (archived) | A file was deleted and a copy kept, if the configuration says so. |
| 24 | Clipboard change | Clipboard contents captured. Off unless you have a specific reason. |
| 25 | Process tampering | Process image changed in memory, as in process hollowing or herpaderping. |
| 26 | File delete detected | A file was deleted (logged without archiving it). |
| 27, 28 | File block executable / shredding | Sysmon blocked the creation of an executable or a file shredding operation. |
| 29 | File executable detected | A new executable file was written to disk. |
| 255 | Error | Sysmon itself hit an error. |
Which Sysmon events matter most when you hunt?
Most hunts start from four events, because together they reconstruct what happened on a machine:
- Event 1 (process creation) gives you the story: which program ran, with which arguments and who launched it. Odd parent-child pairs, such as Word starting PowerShell, show up here.
- Event 3 (network connection) links that process to an external IP address, which is how you find the beacon behind a suspicious binary.
- Event 13 (registry value set) reveals persistence: Run and RunOnce keys, services, and other autostart locations.
- Event 22 (DNS query) tells you which domain was resolved before a connection, and by which process, which the firewall log cannot.
Event 10 deserves its own mention: an unusual process opening lsass.exe with read access is one of the most reliable signs of credential theft.
How do you search Sysmon logs?
On a single machine you can use Event Viewer (Applications and Services Logs › Microsoft › Windows › Sysmon › Operational) or PowerShell. At scale, the events are shipped to a SIEM and searched with its query language.
Get-WinEvent -LogName 'Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' -FilterXPath '*[System[EventID=1]]' -MaxEvents 20 |
Select-Object TimeCreated, MessageTo sweep exported .evtx files for known patterns, tools such as Chainsaw or Hayabusa apply SIGMA rules to Sysmon and Windows logs in seconds. Both appear in the threat hunting courses.
