Android Malware
Android Malware Beginner
Practical Android malware foundations with guided hands-on labs.
119 EUR
From APK unpacking and jadx-gui decompilation to Frida instrumentation, native library analysis, C2 configuration extraction and dynamic behaviour capture — reverse engineering real Android malware in isolated cloud labs, with nothing to install on your own machine.
Lab tools you will use
Practical Android malware foundations with guided hands-on labs.
119 EUR
Intermediate Android malware with complex real-world scenarios and professional workflow.
159 EUR
Get the Beginner + Intermediate courses bundled together and unlock exclusive extras.
Each phase maps to a course module. Scroll to assemble your full progression — from beginner fundamentals to intermediate mastery.
Phase 1
BeginnerAn APK is an archive with rules. You start by reading what the application declares about itself before trusting any of it.
Phase 2
BeginnerAndroid decompiles far better than native code, which makes reviewing what an application really implements realistic.
Phase 3
BeginnerStanding up an instrumented device and watching the application behave rather than inferring behaviour from source.
Phase 4
BeginnerMobile malware exists to move data off the device, so the traffic is where its purpose becomes undeniable.
Phase 5
IntermediateCommercial samples are obfuscated and often packed. This phase is about recognising the protection before fighting it.
Phase 6
IntermediateRuntime instrumentation is the mobile analyst's sharpest tool: it makes an application tell you what it is doing while it does it.
Phase 7
IntermediateSerious families move their secrets out of Java and into compiled libraries, so the analysis has to follow.
Phase 8
IntermediateThe deliverable is a capability assessment, not a permission list — what the application does, evidenced.
The Android Malware path covers reverse engineering mobile applications: taking an APK apart, reading what it really does versus what it claims in its manifest, and observing its behaviour on an instrumented device. Mobile is where a very large share of personal data now lives, which is exactly why it is targeted.
The technical shape of the work differs from Windows analysis in ways worth knowing up front. Android applications are usually Dalvik bytecode, which decompiles to something close to readable Java — a substantially easier starting point than native disassembly. The difficulty moves elsewhere: aggressive obfuscation, native libraries invoked through JNI, encrypted payloads loaded at runtime, and permission models that hide malicious intent inside legitimate-looking requests.
There is also a distribution problem worth understanding, because it shapes what you will actually meet. Desktop malware mostly arrives through email or compromised downloads. Mobile malware frequently arrives through an app store, having passed automated review, or through sideloading that the user was socially engineered into enabling. Families in this space commonly ship a benign first version, build an install base and a review history, then deliver the malicious capability in a later update or fetch it at runtime — which is precisely why static review of a single version is not enough, and why the dynamic phase of this path carries so much weight.
This path is in development. It is being built to the same standard as the rest of the catalogue, with isolated labs and flag-validated exercises on real samples rather than purpose-written demos.
The path uses more tools than fit here. These are the ones that define the work.
| Tool | Category | What for |
|---|---|---|
| jadx-gui | Decompilation | Turning Dalvik bytecode back into readable Java — the usual first step |
| apktool | Unpacking | Decoding resources and the manifest to see declared permissions and components |
| MobSF | Automated analysis | Fast triage across static and dynamic checks before manual work begins |
| Frida | Instrumentation | Hooking functions at runtime to defeat obfuscation and observe real arguments |
| ADB | Device control | Installing, extracting and interacting with applications on the test device |
| Androguard | Static analysis | Scripting analysis across many samples instead of clicking through each |
| APKiD | Fingerprinting | Identifying packers, obfuscators and compilers before wasting time on manual analysis |
| Ghidra | Native analysis | Reversing the native libraries that obfuscated applications hide their logic in |
Covering permissions, components, network behaviour and capability
Written to bypass obfuscation and reveal what the application really passes around
Recovered from applications that decrypt their configuration only at runtime
What the application can actually do, versus what its permission list implies
Mobile analysis is a narrower specialisation than desktop malware analysis, which is precisely what makes it valuable — the supply of analysts who can do it well is much smaller than the demand.
Reverses mobile threats and extracts indicators from them
Tracks mobile banking trojans, stalkerware and spyware families
Assesses mobile applications for weaknesses and malicious behaviour
Investigates compromised mobile devices during incidents
Complete answers about this path, labs, certificates, and refunds
It is in development, being built to the same standard as the rest of the catalogue with isolated labs and flag-validated exercises. The Windows Malware, Phishing with OSINT and Threat Hunting paths are available now.
No. The labs use emulated devices, which are safer for malware and easier to reset between analyses. A physical device is useful for a few specific cases and the material notes where.
The starting point is easier, because Dalvik bytecode decompiles to something close to readable Java rather than assembly. The difficulty shifts to obfuscation, native libraries reached through JNI, and payloads that only appear at runtime.
No, but you need to read Java or Kotlin and understand how an application is put together — activities, services, permissions. You are reading other people's code, not writing your own.
No. iOS analysis is a different discipline with its own tooling and a much more restrictive research environment. This path is Android only, and says so rather than implying broader coverage.
They share the analytical method — triage, static, dynamic, reporting — and differ entirely in tooling. Doing Windows first is helpful but not required; the mobile path is self-contained.